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Introduction 
 
Beginning with the 1985 Farm Act, the United States farm policy began to move 
the crop sector toward greater market orientation and less government involvement.  The 
1996 FAIR Act advanced this movement by shifting the farm policy focus to decoupled 
payments as the primary means of income support.  This Act ended deficiency payments 
and instead provided production flexibility contracts (PFC) payments that were 
independent of the production and the prices of crops, thereby, decoupled.  The PFC 
payments were fixed annual payments to farm operators based on qualified acres 
historically enrolled in commodity programs and fixed program yields.  However, the 
1996 FAIR Act also maintained the nonrecourse marketing loan assistance and loan 
deficiency payments, which were clearly coupled to production.  Overall, the 1996 FAIR 
Act was initiated in order to make agricultural production more market-oriented (Young 
and Westcott, 1996).  This Act was also influenced, to a limited extent, by the 
commitment of the U.S. to reduce trade-distorting price subsidy (amber box) payments in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe).  Under the 
1996 FAIR Act, the United States declared that the PFC payments fell under the WTO 
category of green box subsidies, a category of payments that result in minimal distortions 
of agriculture markets (ERS, USDA,a).   
The 2002 Farm Bill, known as the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
(FSRI), refined the income supports further by providing two types of payments, a fixed 
direct payment (DP) and a counter-cyclical payment (CCP), both based on qualified acres 
and program yields (Westcott, Young and Price).  The CCP payment, however, is 
determined by the relationship between the current year price received relative to a target   3
price.  Direct payments are similar to the PFC payments from the FAIR Act; however, 
the direct payments are fixed for the duration of the 2002 Farm Bill, set on a per unit 
basis, whereas PFC payments were fixed at total expenditure levels for each fiscal year. 
It has been argued that the potential wealth and risk-reducing effects of these 
decoupled payments may elicit a response on the supply of commodities, counteracting 
the purpose of the decoupled payments.  Understanding the nature of the supply response 
of U.S. rice is important because a relatively large share of U.S. rice production is 
exported.  One of the primary concerns in the current negotiations of the Doha 
development round of the WTO is determining the extent to which income support 
payments under current U.S. farm programs are truly decoupled.  This study provides a 
preliminary analysis of the effects of decoupled farm program payments on the supply 
response of U.S. rice using pooled cross-sectional data by state and rice type. 
Background and Literature Review 
  Six states grow almost 99 percent of the rice in the United States.  Arkansas is the 
largest rice producing state, responsible for 45 percent of production.  Arkansas is also 
the only state that is a major producer of both long-grain and medium-grain rice.  
California is the second largest producer with 18 percent of production, nearly all 
medium-grain.  Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Missouri are the other four major rice 
producing states, all primarily growing long-grain varieties.   
The 1996 Farm Bill was a significant shift in U.S. farm policy, with decoupled 
payments as the focus of income support.  The Farm Bill radically changed the approach 
for income payments to farmers by giving a predetermined annual contract payment.  The 
previous method of target prices and deficiency payments were replaced with payments   4
known as Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) that were the heart of the change to a 
more market oriented agriculture sector.  The PFC payments were considered to be 
decoupled which “effectively cuts the link between payments, production, and prices, and 
makes the payments a direct transfer of income to the farm household” (Markets and 
Trade Economics Division, ERS 2003). 
The PFC payments were notified as green box payments for the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), meaning that they had minimal trade-distorting effects on 
production.  This is because they were not based on current prices or production, and they 
were a predetermined amount.  Also, farmers were given almost complete flexibility 
when deciding what crops to plant (with the exception of fruits and vegetables); meaning 
they would receive the PFC payment regardless of what crop they decided to plant or 
how much of it they decided to plant.    
Although PFC payments were classified as non-trade distorting for WTO 
purposes, there have been several studies refuting the idea that they had no effect on 
production.  Probably the most critical analysis of the PFC payments was by Hennessy 
(1998) in which he claimed that such payments may distort production by allowing for 
greater agricultural investment via wealth effects.  Hennessy claimed that farmers are risk 
averse and they become less risk averse as they become wealthier; thus, as they receive 
more government payments, and become wealthier, they may be willing to produce more.  
Hennessy also examined the decoupled nature of CCP payments claiming that there is at 
least an indirect effect of such policies.  He concluded that if farmers are risk averse, 
counter-cyclical payments will have an impact in increasing production and therefore will 
not be decoupled.  Key, Lubowski, and Roberts (2004) agreed with the claims by   5
Hennessy stating that “greater wealth may allow farmers to more easily finance their 
operations and cope with year-to-year fluctuations in profits, effectively reducing farming 
costs.” 
Research has also been conducted contesting the claim that PFC payments were 
coupled.  Analysis by ERS (2003,b) indicates that the PFC payments have no effect on 
agricultural production in either the long run or the short run.  Their study concluded that 
the links between decoupled payments and agricultural production are indirect and 
depend on the household response to the payment.  They concluded that PFC cash 
payments increased recipients’ well-being, but in ways that can be expected to have 
minimal links to farm production levels.  In the worst case “PFC payments are no more 
distorting of farmers’ production decisions than deficiency payments were under the pre-
1996 programs” (Tweeten and Thompson, 2002). 
While the decoupled stance of the 1996 Farm Bill brought about greater market 
orientation and less government intervention; low commodity prices from 1998-2001 
exposed the lack of an adequate safety net.  These low prices caused Congress to 
authorize supplemental payments known as marketing loss assistance (MLA) payments.  
For the 1998 crop, contract holders received additional payments equal to approximately 
50 percent of that year’s PFC payments.  In 1999 and 2000, contract holders received 
MLA payments equal to the 1999 PFC payment rate.  The amount of payments made, 
due to MLA payments was large; for 1997 the only direct payments made to rice farmers 
were $448 million.  By 1999 direct payments exceeded $1.3 billion.  During this same 
period that the MLA payments were made, the market value of production dropped to 
$1.23 billion from $1.76 billion, a result of much lower prices (Childs, 2001).  These   6
MLA payments were classified as amber box support payments in the WTO raising fear 
that the ceiling for amber box support payments might be exceeded. 
The need to provide an adequate safety net in the face of high emergency 
payments, combined with the need to keep income support payments below the WTO 
specified level; lead to the provisions of the current 2002 Farm Bill.  As mentioned 
before, the three major provisions of the Farm Bill were direct payments, counter-cyclical 
payments, and the marketing assistance loans.  Marketing assistance loans are price 
supports designed to provide eligible producers with financing; therefore, they are 
included in the gross margin variable of the area harvested equation used for this study, 
rather than being specified as a separate independent variable.  Direct payments and 
counter-cyclical payments are income support mechanisms; therefore, they do not belong 
in the price component of the gross margin and must be specified as separate independent 
variables. 
Direct payments, considered to be the most decoupled of the three payments, are 
similar to the production flexibility contract payments under the 1996 FAIR in that the 
payment rate is fixed and is not affected by current production or by current market 
prices.  Direct payments are calculated as the direct payment rate ($2.35 per cwt.) times 
85 percent of the farm’s base acreage times the farm’s direct payment yield.  Yields are 
based on direct payment program yields, rather than actual yields.  The main difference 
between the direct payment and the PFC payment is that the direct payment rates are 
constant through the duration of the 2002 Farm Bill, while the PFC payment rate declined 
over the life of the 1995 Farm Bill.  The direct payment rate does not change with current 
production or market prices; however, farmers were allowed to update their base acreage   7
with the implementation of the 2002 Farm Bill, which has also lead many to question the 
decoupled nature of the payments. 
Counter-cyclical payments were enacted in the 2002 Farm Bill to replace the ad 
hoc MLA payments that were made from 1998-2001.  These payments are not tied to 
production, but they are tied to market prices in that if the market price is lower than 
$8.15/cwt than these payments are made.  Counter-cyclical payments are made whenever 
the target price ($10.50) minus the direct payment rate ($2.35) is higher than the effective 
price
1.  The maximum counter-cyclical payment that can be paid is $1.65/cwt, with the 
calculation per farm computed similar to the direct payment.  However, since the 2002 
Farm bill allowed producers to update their counter-cyclical payment yield, the counter-
cyclical payment program yield is higher than the direct payment program yield for all 
the rice producing states.  Counter-cyclical payments for a production year are paid in 
three partial payments if authorized.  The first partial payment is based on up to 35 
percent of the projected payments rate and is made after October 1 when the crop is 
harvested.  The second payment is based on up to 70 percent of the projected payment 
rate and is made after February 1
st of the year after production.  The final payment is 
made after the end of the marketing year.  In the case that the projected payment rate 
changes and the first partial payment rate was too high; the excess is then subtracted from 
the second partial or the final payment.  This was the case for the 2003 CCP payments..  
In this case the projected payment rate was between $.65/cwt and $.90/cwt when the first 
                                                 
1 The effective price is the sum of 1) the higher of the national average farm price for the marketing year or 
the national loan rate ($6.50) and 2) the direct payment rate.   8
partial payment was made.  However, in January 2005, the final payment rate was just 
$.07/cwt, meaning that the difference must be refunded. 
  Several studies have been directed towards investigating the question of how 
decoupled are the income support payments of the 1996 FAIR Act and 2002 FSRI Act.  
Most of these studies use data obtained during the implementation period of the FAIR 
Act and make implications of the possibilities of the FSRI; therefore, evidence related 
directly to the effects of the FSRI Act is scarce.    
  Much of the literature that examines this topic argues that such payments are not 
completely decoupled.  The prevailing argument is that there is at least an indirect effect 
in such policies.  Anton and Le Mouel (2003) developed a framework to assess the risk-
related incentives to produce created by the loan deficiency payments and the counter-
cyclical payments (CCP) in the FSRI Act, with the conclusion from Hennessy’s research 
as their foundation.  They modeled the impacts of the CCP in the context of a risk-averse 
farmer maximizing expected utility.  Anton and Le Mouel concluded that both CCP and 
loan deficiency payments create risk-inducing incentives to produce in most 
commodities.  However, for rice, CCP’s did not create risk-reducing incentives; although, 
there was a very large reduction in risk premiums using the loan rate from 2001.  Anton 
and Le Mouel concluded that, although, the risk effects of CCP’s were smaller than those 
of the loan deficiency payments for all commodities, they could be of comparable 
magnitude.  Their research also concluded that farmers are risk averse, as stated in 
Hennessey’s research.  
Other literature has differed in the opinion that counter-cyclical payments are 
coupled.  Westcott, et al. (2002) argue that counter-cyclical payments do not affect   9
marginal revenue, because they do not directly affect the farmers’ current production.  
Rather, the expected marginal revenue of a farmers’ additional output is the expected 
market price, so counter-cyclical payments do not affect production directly through 
expected returns.   
Westcott and Meyer (2003) examined the supply response of cotton under the 
provisions of the 2002 Farm Act, specifically investigating the decoupled nature of 
counter-cyclical payments and direct payments.  They stated “the expected marginal 
revenue of a farmers’ additional current output is the expected market price so counter-
cyclical payments do not affect production directly through expected net returns. 
However, because counter-cyclical payments are linked to market prices, they may 
influence production decisions indirectly by reducing total and per unit revenue risk 
associated with price variability in some situations.”  Westcott and Meyer also 
determined that direct payments are largely decoupled since these are fixed payments; 
however, the payments are tied to acreage, so the benefits will be capitalized into farm 
values, thereby increasing wealth. 
A review of past literature suggests that the label of decoupled payments 
associated with direct payments and counter-cyclical payments is widely debated.  Past 
studies indicate that direct payments are the more decoupled of the two; although, some 
claim that indirect effects from these payments have an effect on production.  Counter-
cyclical payments are considered by many to be decoupled in the sense that the payments 
are based on fixed acreage; however, they are based on current market prices, thus also 
affecting production at least indirectly.             
   10
Data & Methods 
This study utilizes econometric methods to obtain the parameter estimates by 
panel data methods.  The data for this study are from the period 2002-2004 and were 
obtained from USDA, NASS, and ERS.  The cross-sectional panel data are from the six 
rice producing states and two types (long and medium) of rice.  A pooled cross-sectional 
acreage supply response equation was estimated to identify the extent to which the 
income support payments are decoupled.  Specifically a least squares dummy variable 
model was utilized to capture the individual heterogeneity of the cross-sections. 
In this study, United States rice area harvested is analyzed through the use of an 
empirical supply model based on the naïve expectations model specified by Nerlove; as 
this was determined to be the best-fitting model.  The main objective of this study is to 
determine if government intervention, namely direct payments and counter-cyclical 
payments, are empirically decoupled for the period 2002-2004.     
Lin et al. state that the “theoretical underpinning of supply response assumes that 
producers wish to maximize expected net return.  Based on the firm’s implicit, multi-
product production function, it can be shown that the supply of a farm commodity is a 
function of output and input prices for that commodity as well as output and input prices 
for competing crops (2000).  Therefore, to characterize a supply response function, one 
must look at what constitutes net returns.  Supply theory strongly proposes that 
production is directly related to prices, with profit maximization the focus of the farmer 
(Ferris, 1995).  The key to understanding supply theory is to realize the importance the 
role that prices play; and to develop a logical theory for expected prices.  As mentioned 
before, production is related to prices; however, in the case of the supply sector, prices   11
are sometimes difficult to determine.  This is because when a farmer is deciding the 
amount tol plant, a certain harvest price is generally not available; rather there is only the 
expected price.  Based on this knowledge and the objectives specified, the generic area 
harvested equation for United States rice used for this study is specified as follows: 












Where the subscript i indicates the specific state and j indicates the rice type.  AHt stands 
for the area harvested in time t and is the dependent variable of interest.  AHt-1 indicates 
the lag of the area harvested as indicated for the dependent variable.  GM* indicates the 
expected gross margin for the rice farmer; which is calculated as the expected revenue 
minus the expected costs.  DP indicates the direct payments per acre received by the 
farmer.  Finally, CCP* is the expected counter-cyclical payment to be received.  The 
expected gross margin and the expected counter-cyclical payment are the sources of 
variability that will be investigated by the hypothesized models.    
Many area harvested models incorporate the price of other commodities that 
compete with planting decisions as an independent variable in the model.  However, due 
to statistical reasons (lack of degrees of freedom), and because this research was not 
concerned with explaining the effect that other crops have on rice planting decisions; the 
decision to not include a variable representing other crops prices was made.  It would also 
be difficult to specify one or even two competing crops that were grown in all six of the 
rice producing states.          
Alternative specifications of the area harvested equation that best described the 
data were considered.  Previous literature suggests several alternative area harvested   12
models that should be tested.  The three specifications evaluated for this model were: a 
counter-cyclical lagged model, a naïve expectations model, and a futures’ prices model.   
The counter-cyclical lagged model suggests that farmers based their expected 
gross margin and their expected counter-cyclical payment on payments from last year.  
This model would therefore use gross margin lagged as the proxy for expected gross 
margin and counter-cyclical payments lagged as the proxy for expected counter-cyclical 
payments in equation (1).  The expected gross margin is formulated based on the idea of 
naïve expectations, where farmers only look at one lag period when formulating planting 














 Where the subscript i indicates the state and j indicates the rice type.  The 
independent variable RYt-1 is the actual yield lagged, LR is the loan rate, MPt-1 is the 
market price received in the lagged period, LDPt-1 is the Loan Deficiency Payment made 
in the lagged period, and VCt-1 is the variable cost from the lagged period.  The maximum 
of LR (capped at $6.50); versus the market price lagged by state and type with the LDP 
by state added to the market price; is then the expected price.  The expected price (in 
every case the MP + LDP was the greater amount) is then deflated by the CPI and 
multiplied by the actual lagged yields to formulate the revenue received in period t-1.  
The deflated variable costs (VC) by state and type are then subtracted from the revenue to 
equate the expected gross margin in period t for individual state and type. 
The estimated counter-cyclical lagged model had several problems such as the 
expected gross margin was not statistically significant.  Multicollinearity was present   13
between the direct payments and the counter-cyclical lagged payments; and both direct 
payments and the counter-cyclical payment lagged coefficients were statistically 
significant, indicating that both direct payments and counter-cyclical payments are 
coupled.  The coefficient sign for direct payments was positive, indicating that if the 
government raised the direct payment rate area harvested would increase.  A more 
significant aspect of this empirical specification was that there were only two years of 
counter-cyclical payments made if the time period is lagged; therefore, the marketing loss 
assistant payments (MLA) for the 2001 period were used as a proxy for the counter-
cyclical data for 2002.  These payments were $2.49/cwt; however, under the 2002 Farm 
Bill the maximum the current CCP payment can be is $1.65/cwt.  Therefore, it seems the 
biggest problem with this model is missing data.  This is difficult to fix; however, since 
the MLA payments seem to be the best proxy for the CCP lagged payment.    
The futures’ prices model suggests that farmers are not naïve; rather they are 
forward looking and base their price expectations on futures’ prices. The area harvested 
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Where EP is the expected price for period t, RYt-1 is the yield lagged one period, and PY
i 
is the program yield for counter-cyclical payments specified by state.  Difficulties arise   14
when employing the idea that farmers project revenues based on futures prices.  First, 
there is only a futures price for long grain and not medium grain rice.  As stated by Ferris, 
“to presume that decision makers can integrate supply and demand information and 
accurately forecast prices is unrealistic.  Even the best of econometricians have difficulty 
accomplishing that” (1998).  Another problem that arises when calculating the expected 
GM is the amount of loan deficiency payments (LDP).  Since these payments are paid on 
current daily market prices and production; no judgment could be made on the forecasted 
payments for a period.  That coupled with the fact that all of the projected CCP amounts 
were $1.65; essentially bases the projections on false information for gross margin.  This 
is because realistically both LDP payments are made, and the CCP payment rate has been 
$1.65 for only one period and less than that for the other two years.  Statistical problems 
associated with this model were that neither expected gross margin, nor direct payments, 
nor expected counter-cyclical payments were statistically significant.  Also 
multicollinearity was present and could not be remedied without changing the model 
specification.  
The naïve expectations model was determined to be the best in estimating the area 
harvested model for the data utilized.  The rational expectations model treats expected 
gross margin the same way as the counter-cyclical lagged model for equation (2); 
however, the specification for the expected counter-cyclical payment is different.  This 
model is based on the idea that farmers are both naïve and forward looking in their 
decision making.  The rational expectations model has several benefits with the most 
important being that the actual counter-cyclical payments paid are used in the model, 
except in the case of 2003.  For this year the announced CCP at the time of the first   15
payment was $.65 announced in October; however, the final CCP calculated January of 
the next year was changed to $.07.  Since the first announcements are considered to be a  
projection of what farmers expected the final payment to be, this was the amount used for 
this model.  This model can be considered to be credible since farmers have a good idea 
of what the farm price and the counter-cyclical payment will be for that year, based on 
projections from USDA. 
The data used for this study are considered to be panel data since there are 
observations on the same units (cross-sections) in several different periods (time series).  
The data is estimated using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), while allowing for 
cross-sectional effects by specifying different intercepts for state and type.  The type of 
model specified is the least squares dummy variable model which is where a dummy 
variable is used for each individual and the intercept is omitted.  Doing this allows each 
individual to have a different intercept, and so OLS, including all these dummy variables, 
should guard against the omitted variable bias (Kennedy, 2003). 
Results and Analysis 
  The results for the original naïve expectations model are presented in Table 1.  
The Durbin h statistic, used to calculate serial correlation in the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable, indicates that there is negative serial correlation present.  For the 
original model, CCP payments are the only regressor with a parameter estimate 
statistically different than zero.  Therefore, the model indicates that gross margin; lagged 
area harvested, and direct payments are not statistically different than zero.  The short-run 
elasticities were also calculated and presented in Table 1.  The estimated elasticity for 
lagged_GM seems to be very low, while that for DP is negative and relatively high.  This   16
would indicate that farmers are more responsive to direct payments than the expected 
gross margin; however, expected gross margin makes up a larger proportion of farmers’ 
income than direct payments, indicating that farmers should be more responsive to the 
expected gross margin.  The variance inflation factor
2 indicates that multicollinearity 
might be present, especially in the sense that the direct payments might be correlated with 
lagged GM or CCP payments.  The F-value and the adjusted-R
2 both indicate that the 
model is statistically significant.  Overall, the need to include the gross margin in the 
final model combined with the statistical problems encountered, indicate that some 
variables should be excluded and a new model should be estimated.   
 
                                                 
2 Statistical measure of multicollinearity. A measure less than 10 indicates no problems; however, 
higher than 10 indicates that multicollinearity might be a problem.   17





Intercept 2643139 0.04 -
(1096975)
Lag_AH -0.1141 0.54 171.47
(0.1805)
Lag_GM 70.78 0.79 17.67 0.01464
(253.83)
Medium -1332045 0.01 207.16
(226317)
CA -311091 0.65 1810.68
(669083)
LA -1032830 0.01 101.54
(158445)
MS -1316092 0.01 140.99
(186705)
MO -1263096 0.01 208.83
(227227)
TX -1157979 0.01 301.37
(272965)
DP -13932 0.31 1551.16 -2.88140
(12899)










  The final model utilized for this research is presented in Table 2.  The final model 
is specified as area harvested is a function of the state and type of rice; the gross margin; 
and counter-cyclical payment.  The parameter estimate for the gross margin lagged is 
343.43, indicating that as the gross margin from last year increases by one dollar, area 
harvested increases 343.43 thousand acres.  The parameter estimate for counter-cyclical 
payment is 956.29, indicating that as counter-cyclical payment increases a dollar for the 
year, area harvested increases 956.29 thousand acres.  For the final model, 
multicollinearity is not problematic and there is no serial correlation present.   18







Lag_GM 343.43 0.01 2.97 0.07103
(106.05)
Medium -1217933 0.01 2.17
(23615)
CA -853666 0.01 2.60
(25858)
LA -801849 0.01 2.16
(23572)
MS -1110565 0.01 1.75
(21196)
MO -1159722 0.01 1.72
(20991)
TX -1142174 0.01 1.71
(20987)











  The statistical models estimated indicate that the area harvested from last year 
does not have a statistical effect on the area harvested this year, although past literature 
claims it is important.  A possible reason that this variable was deemed statistically 
insignificant was that there were only three years of data and the area harvested for these 
three years differed greatly. 
  This analysis examined the nature of the income support payments to rice 
farmers, specifically direct payments and counter-cyclical payments.  The final statistical 
model indicates that direct payments do not have an effect on area harvested since the 
estimate is not statistically different than zero.  However, the parameter estimate for 
counter-cyclical payments is statistically different from zero, suggesting that counter-  19
cyclical payments are not decoupled and that they have an effect on the area harvested of 
rice.   
  The results of this analysis indicate that direct payments are decoupled and do not 
induce a supply response; while, the hypothesis that counter-cyclical payments have no 
effect on the supply response was rejected.  These results confirm the ideas of Hennessy 
that counter-cyclical payments elicit a supply response that can be attributable to risk-
reducing or wealth effects.  However, unlike Hennessy’s results, direct payments were 
determined to be decoupled.     
Summary and Conclusion 
  The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) brought about changes 
in domestic support for the agriculture sector.  Domestic support is classified according to 
its trade-distorting impacts, with amber box support the focus of reduction.  The changes 
in the URAA have had an impact of the provisions in the 1996 Farm Bill and the 2002 
Farm Bill.    
  The United States farm sector has gradually moved to more market orientation 
and less government involvement, with the ushering in of the URAA provisions.  The 
1996 Farm Bill drastically shifted such policy to decoupled payments.  However, when a 
strong decline in prices exposed the lack of an adequate safety net; counter-cyclical 
provisions were included in the 2002 Farm Bill to address this issue.  U.S. Farm Bills 
have moved towards decoupled payments in accordance with the world-wide movement 
towards freer trade.  The 2002 Farm Bill allocated income support payments to farmers in 
the form of direct payments and counter-cyclical payments; both of which have been 
debated on whether they are truly decoupled.     20
  This analysis examined the decoupled nature of direct payments and counter-
cyclical payments to determine if they have an impact on U.S. rice area harvested.  A 
naïve expectations model was specified, with the results indicating that direct payments 
are decoupled; however, counter-cyclical are not.  Overall, the results indicate that a 
change in the expected gross margin or counter-cyclical payments would stimulate a 
supply response in rice production.  The lack of a significant amount of time-series data 
renders results of this analysis as preliminary and tentative; as such more data would 
allow for better inferences. 
  The results of this study concur with past literature that counter-cyclical payments 
elicit a supply response.  However, direct payments were deemed to be decoupled, which 
differs from the same literature.  Westcott’s study involving cotton indicated that counter-
cyclical payments are mostly decoupled and direct payments are decoupled.  The results 
from this study agree with those results in that direct payments are considered to be 
decoupled and counter-cyclical payments are coupled.    
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